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1. Introduction 
Teach for America (TFA) aims to some day make it possible for every American 
child to receive a great education. As means to that end TF A attempts to get teachers 
"willing to go above and beyond the constraints of the system to ensure that their students 
excel" into classrooms, to encourage "long-term, sustained leadership in education;" and 
to "change the prevailing ideology around educational inequity," which supports a 
rationalization that poor children achieve less than others because they are unmotivated 
and do not receive support at home (see www.teachforamerica.org). The organization 
argues that teachers alone cannot change the system, but that by influencing future 
leaders it can make the issue of educational equity a major focus for policy and funding. 
Corps members are at once conceived of as teachers and as backers-in-training. 
TF A argues that these are complements - no learning without good teachers, no 
support for learning without backers, and no faith in the power of teaching without a 
change in ideology. While all are important, because support, faith in teaching, and good 
teachers already exist a program which increased only one of them could be sufficient to 
change education, though not necessarily enough to achieve TFA's goal. However, it is 
possible that by recruiting, selecting, and training teachers for all three goals the program 
does not achieve each of them to the best of its ability. For the purposes of this analysis, 
I assume that while creating backers and changing ideology almost definitely improve 
education in the long run, school districts that are involved with TF A need to know that 
the program at least does no harm to current students, and ideally improves their 
immediate outcomes. 
While serving as teachers, TF A corps members are able to affect their own 
students, those outside their classes, and the overall functioning of the school because 
they enter with different needs, ambitions, and skills than do other teachers. Though 
often ignored, the second and third of these effects, which occur outside ofTFA 
classrooms, must be included when determining the value of the program and its relative 
merits as compared to other strategies of recruiting teachers. In this paper I use panel 
data on New York City students in grades 3-8 to estimate this net impact of TF A on a 
school. The total TF A effect appears to be positive and significant, but to be smaller for 
high-need schools, even after controlling for that need. TF A teachers also appear to be 
markedly more effective in elementary school grades than in middle school grades. 
2. The TFA Program 
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Teach for America targets recent college graduates of all majors and from a wide 
array of colleges, many but not all of them very competitive, and others with experience 
in leadership positions and a strong record of success, academic and otherwise. 
Applicants are interviewed twice and assigned scores according to a metric, developed by 
TF A, which emphasizes qualities it has observed in successful teachers. These include 
past achievement, perseverance, critical thinking skills, ability to influence and motivate 
others, organization, respect for others, and a devotion to the program's goals and vision. 
Those whose scores meet certain levels are accepted, at rates are comparable to those of 
an Ivy League university. Teachers commit to a two-year teaching assignment. 
Most recruits have not studied pedagogy prior to entering TF A. Instead 
all new Corps members attend a 5-week summer institute during which they attend 
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classes on pedagogy and subject matter, and team-teach a summer school class with other 
TFAers. 
TF A targets low-performing, low-income, high minority schools which have 
difficulty hiring enough teachers, particularly those qualified in math and science, and 
those willing to teach special education. In the 2007-2008 school year TFA placed 
approximately 5,000 teachers in 26 regions across the US and at least 3 new placement 
areas will be added for 2008-2009. Most sites are in inner cities, the rest in rural areas. 
Recruits are placed in a region based both on their preferences and qualifications. 
Administrators in each TF A school are able to request teachers for a number of positions 
from TF A, and choose from those in their area by looking through a book of resumes and 
other information on candidates. This occurs over the spring and summer, at which time 
they likely have not finished their other hiring. Again, corps members can request 
subjects and grades to teach, but the needs of schools are privileged in making 
assignments. Most TF A schools (90% in New York City) hire more than one TF A 
member, and some employ several of them. 
Once in their schools, TF A teachers receive periodic mentoring by a regional 
program director. States and school districts generally require them to participate in 
alternative certification programs, which vary from those which carry almost no 
requirements to those which involve enrolling in a masters of education program. 
Americorps education awards are available to fund a part of coursework, and TF A has 
special agreements with colleges and universities in some areas with high requirements in 
order to lower the cost of earning a certificate or degree. The programs that are most 
useful for TF A teachers, and with which TF A has agreements, range from highly 
respected universities (Johns Hopkins) to lower profile institutions. Corps members are 
paid the same as other new teachers with the same qualifications, according to district 
pay schedules. 
Most Corps members leave their initial teaching assignment after their two-year 
commitment and almost all who remain do so after a third year. Kane, Rockoff and 
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Staiger (2006) estimated that, wit..lJ.in New York City, in a steady state 45% of all teachers 
who had gone through the TF A program were in their first two years, as compared to 
20% of traditionally certified teachers (P5). Boyd et. al. 2007 estimated that 25% of 
teachers in the poorest 10% of schools were in their first or second year, so TF A teachers 
appear to leave at a higher rate than even their peers in similar schools. In some cases 
IF A teachers are replaced with new corps members, in others they are replaced by 
another, non-TFA, teacher. Some who continue teaching move to charter, alternative, 
and private schools, so their exit from the profession is overstated by many analyses, 
which use district payroll and personnel records that may not fully count these teachers. 
While these teachers are not lost to education, they are lost to the school system in which 
they worked, and perhaps to the neediest students. Turnover is generally assumed to be 
problematic because new teachers are not as good as they will be with some experience, 
but it is also necessary in order for TF A alumni to attain many of the "backer" positions 
from which the organization hopes they will contribute. 
There are several impressive alumni success stories, but to my knowledge no truly 
representative data exists. 57% of alumni responded to a 2007 survey by TF A. Of 
respondents 67% remain in education, about half of whom teach (1/3 of the total). 35% 
of those who remain teachers (1/9th of the whole) move to alternative and charter schools, 
leaving about 22% of alumni teaching in public schools. More than half of those who 
leave the education field remain involved in social justice or poverty work (Teach for 
America 2007). These numbers likely overstate the true involvement of alumni - those 
who are still involved with the program's goals probably respond at higher rates than do 
others. Also, because TF A attracts and selects people who are interested in social justice 
in general and educational change in particular, it is unsurprising that many of its alumni 
continue to address these issues. 
The New York City Corps is currently TF A's largest, with 1000 members (out of 
80,000 total teachers in the city public schools), placed in over 300 schools. Most are in 
the Bronx, while others work in Upper Manhattan and Brooklyn. In New York, TF A 
teachers must pass two written tests - one on general teaching skills and another on 
subject matter knowledge - and emoll in either a certificate or M.A. program to begin 
teaching. To continue after three years they must have received their master's degree. 
New York City is unusual among TFA sites because another, fairly similar 
program, New York City Teaching Fellows (NYCTF) operates in the city on a larger 
scale. Fellows are generally older than TFA teachers, with only 30% coming directly 
from college, and are selected to be career teachers rather than short-term teachers and 
long-term backers. They tend to have done well in school and in the careers they have 
pursued. Fellows undergo pre-service training like that used by TF A, and emoll in a 
subsidized masters program while teaching. About 8,000, or 10% of teachers in the New 
York Public Schools in the current school year, became a teacher through the fellows 
program, even though it was only founded in 2000. Recently other programs following 
the NYCTF model have begun, though generally not on the same scale. These are both 
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alternatives to TF A for districts and schools in need of qualified teachers and an 
extension of its model of selective, high-profile alternative certification. 
3. Literature 
Whether TF A is able to produce effective teachers has been the subject of debate 
since the program began in 1990, and gained greater urgency in the late 1990s when 
alternative certification programs began to proliferate. In recent years, as the program 
has expanded, it has become possible to empirically test the effect of TF A teachers. 
Raymond, Fletcher, and Luque (2001) and Darling-Hammond, et. al. (2005) addressed 
the impact of TF A teachers on student academic achievement in Houston. Both found 
that TF A teachers were generally the same or worse than teachers who had gone through 
traditional certification programs, and better than those in other alternative programs, as 
measured by their students' performance on standardized tests. 
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Kane, Rockoff, and Staiger (2006) studied New York City students in grades 4-7 
in order to determine ifthe certification status of their teacher (TFA, New York Teaching 
Fellows, international, and traditionally certified teachers) impacted their achievement on 
standardized tests. Their results suggested that Teach for America teachers perform 
slightly (but statistically significantly) better than the average teacher in teaching math 
and essentially the same at teaching reading. Boyd, et.al. (2005) conducted a similar 
study comparing teachers who had entered teaching through different pathways, also 
using New York City data. They found that teachers who entered through alternative 
certification routes were at first worse at teaching both reading and math than those who 
had gone through a traditional teacher education program, but that the differences 
disappeared after 2-5 years of teaching, at which point most TFA teachers leave. 
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Glazerman, Mayer, and Decker (2006) received agreements from principals to 
assign students randomly to classes in a sample of grades-within-schools which contained 
both TF A and non-TF A teachers. TF A teachers were compared with all other teachers in 
the same grade within a school to determine the differences between them. Their results 
were similar to those of Kane, Rockoff and Staiger - TF A teachers were better than other 
teachers at teaching math and the same at teaching reading. Glazerman, et. al. also 
examined TFA teachers' impact on other student outcomes - retention in grade, 
assignment to summer school, disciplinary incidents, chronic absence, tardiness, and the 
extent to which students disrupted classes - but found them to be the same as their 
counterparts in all but the last category. Assessments of disruptive behavior came only 
from a teacher survey, and as other things which might be associated with it, particularly 
disciplinary incidents, were not different in TF A classrooms, the authors speculated that 
the true difference may be that TF A teachers expect students to be less disruptive, based 
on their own experience as students. 
4. The TF A Effect 
These studies, and all others which I am aware of, only address the effects of TF A 
teachers 'on the students in their classrooms. TF A teachers should have different impacts 
beyond their classrooms as well, because they enter with different skills, motivations, and 
needs, and because their turnover structure is different than that of other teachers. 
4.1 Quality 
TF A teachers enter with less training than those who go through traditional 
education programs, so they might be expected to need more guidance at first than other 
teachers. Boyd, et.al's conclusion that alternatively certified teachers were markedly 
worse than their traditionally certified peers during their first 2-5 years, but then 
performed at the same level, would suggest that this is true, at least at a classroom level. 
In many schools in which TF A teachers teach, however, most new teachers do not come 
through traditional certification, instead recruited through other alternative or emergency 
certification programs. Where entrance requirements are low these teachers may begin 
teaching with little or no training. Thus TF A teachers are at least sometimes no less 
trained -and possibly more trained - than are their peers. 
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TF A teachers are also rigorously selected for a number of characteristics which 
might predict their being more involved in after school activities and more able to seek 
out the resources they need, be they mentoring, materials, or support from students' 
families. Within the program teachers are trained and encouraged to engage in these and 
other behaviors which TFA believes will make them more effective. Though many well-
respected traditional and alternative certification programs are able to be very selective in 
the candidates they accept, they look for different things in candidates, and likely 
emphasize leadership experience and the ability to seek out resources less than TF A does. 
TF A also runs its own mentoring program. Other programs and school districts also offer 
mentoring, but TF A's serves as a further method for the program to shape teachers 
according to its ideal. It may be either be better or (less likely) worse than those offered 
to other new teachers in the same school or district. 
4.2 Turnover 
TF A teachers are more likely to stay during the first 2 years, and more likely to 
leave after year 2 or year 3 than are others (Boyd et. al. 2005). As noted earlier, their 
overall turnover is higher than that for teachers in general in low income schools. Some 
turnover is a good thing, as some corps members discover that they are not skilled at 
teaching, despite the rigorous selection process TF A uses. That experienced by TF A 
teachers is likely far beyond this level. 
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While many other teachers move from low- to middle- or high-income schools 
after a few years, TF A teachers tend to leave education in general if they stop teaching in 
low-income, high-need areas. Thus when they leave their teaching-specific skills are 
lost, rather than being transferred to a different group of students. Hanushek, Kain and 
Rivkin (2005) found empirical gains in student test scores to be significant over the first 2 
years, but not after. The conclusion by Boyd et.al. that alternatively certified teachers 
were even worse than other starting teachers but caught up after a few years is 
particularly troubling, as most TF A teachers have left their initial schools by then. 
Turnover forces schools and teachers to build social capital- the relationships, 
understandings and systems which allow people to work together effectively - more 
often. Even in schools with high levels of turnover, some amount of social capital is 
necessary simply for the school to function. Faster rates of turnover should mean that 
more time, in total, is invested in the cultivation of social capital, and that the school is 
less effective, on average, as it is more common for it to be in the early building stages, 
when this capital most likely does not function particularly well. 
Because there are indications that teachers are noticeably worse than they would 
otherwise be during their first 2 years in particular, perhaps carrying on to the fifth year, 
having many teachers who stay for only 2 -3 years may be worse than having some who 
leave after 1 and some who stay beyond the third year, even if their average turnover 
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were the same. If this is the case, TF A schools might be putting significant resources into 
training teachers, only to have them leave teaching when fully trained. 
Some have claimed that high turnover makes TF A unable to truly affect 
education, as it means its teachers are relatively inexperienced and unprepared. TF A has 
also been criticized as a well-meaning but mistaken movement in which a few young 
people, at least on average whiter and higher income than the population they are serving, 
expect to come in and "fix" systemic problems without understanding their underlying 
causes (Darling-Hammond, 1994). Others have argued that TF A teachers are better then 
other starting teachers by a large enough margin to compensate for their high turnover 
rate. Kane, Rockoff and Staiger, 2006, estimated that TF A teachers would have to create 
a .02 standard deviations difference to compensate for their high exit rate, approximately 
what they found. This only accounts for the in-classroom effects of turnover, so a full 
accounting of the loss to the school would be somewhat higher, but so would a full 
estimate of their benefits. 
Rather than attempting to slow the turnover of its teachers by recruiting those who 
are interested in education as a career, TFA focuses on those who are willing to make the 
two-year commitment and it predicts will be successful as teachers. Corps members are 
not required to attain any more education-specific credentials than are mandated by local 
certification requirements, and are not specifically encouraged to stay in teaching for the 
long term. TF A does, however, have partnerships with corporations and fellowships, 
encouraging college graduates to defer their offers for two years in order to teach, and 
with programs which offer training in education administration. This is not surprising -
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for TFA's goals, as it understands them, to be reached, many or most of its alumni must 
leave teaching for other positions in administration, politics, and elsewhere. 
5. Data 
In order to test the presence and size of these quality and turnover effects, I use 
school-level panel data on scores from the New York City Department of Education 
(NYCDOE) and yearly Report Cards, produced by New York State, which list school 
characteristics. Students in grades 3-8 are given yearly tests in English language arts and 
math in New York City. The score data is available for the years 1998-1999 to 2006-
2007, while characteristic data is currently only available for the years 2003-2004 to 
2005-2006. TF A has identified the schools in which it placed teachers, and the number 
placed there, for the years 1999-2005, which gives me a full count of TFA for the 2000-
2001 to 2005-2006 years. Because oflimitations imposed by the construction ofthis 
data, I only fully use the years 2003-4 and 2004-5, the English Language Arts test, and 
districts 1-10 and 12 (out of31 in the city.) Data on student scores and TFA placement in 
prior years is included in my data. The districts chosen include almost all of the TF A 
teachers placed in New York City during the 1999-2005 period and more than 300,000 
students in 2003-2004. 
Table 1. 
I 
i Variable Means and Standard Deviations 
I Mean Std. Deviation 
I Percent TFA 2.190 5.046 
Percent Free Lunch 
Percent Latino 
Percent Black 















Using student test scores to measure teaching skill or the impact of schooling is 
imperfect. Many importantthings which students learn are not well measured by tests, 
and some of them may detract from the kind of learning which is tested. However, they 
provide a proxy for learning, and are far easier to work with than even the most tangible 
of qualitative measures. I believe that they are a particularly strong proxy in the 
elementary grades when the tests focus mostly on basic skills, for low-performing 
students, for whom the additional material learned is, again, a basic skill, and in reading 
and math, where curriculums cover the same material, if sometimes in different ways. 
While they are imperfect, they are also better than useless. 
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It may be that some kinds of teachers are more dedicated to testing, or that some 
see it as an end and other as a means. If, for instance, TF A teachers were less concerned 
with testing than others because they did not seek to move up the standard career ladder 
for teachers, we could expect their students to achieve lower on tests, in comparison to 
other students, than their actual achievement should predict. Given TF A's support for 
standardized testing, and their insistence that teachers make 1.5 grade levels of 
improvement with students in each year, it is unlikely that they are systematically less 
concerned with testing results (McClaugherty Cosner 2007). If school-level emphasis on 
tests is correlated with some independent variables, or differs noticeably between TF A 
and non-TF A schools I am unable to test for it, and it will appear as differences in student 
outcomes. 
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6. Model and Results 
Educational production functions relate some vector of student characteristics and 
some vector or vectors of characteristics associated with school, teacher, district, etc. to 
student outcomes, usually measured by test scores. Because of the data available to me I 
use school average scores and characteristics. 
6.1 Controlling for prior year score 
A value added model, using gains in scores rather than absolute scores as the 
dependent variable, describes the effect of all inputs in the year studied, rather than all 
cumulative past effects. The previous year's score represents the accumulation of past 
teaching, family, and peer effects, as well as individual intellect, and may predict the 
student's environment in the year studied. It is also possible that teaching certain levels 
of skills is easier for particular teachers or teachers in general. For these reasons I 
include the previous year's score as an independent variable within the value-added 
specification. 
The NYCDOE uses the percent of students receiving free lunch and classified as 
Limited English Proficiency to place schools in categories according to need. They are 
also often strong predictors of student scores. Race is intended to proxy for cultural and 
other dynamics which may cause families and students to value and think about learning 
differently, and is traditionally included. 
(1) Yijt = u) + U2Sijt-l + U3Bjt + U4Ljt + usLEPjt + u6Freejt+ u7TFAjt + Cijt 
Yijt is the change in the average score for grade i at school j, in year t from year t-l. Sijt-l 
is the grade's average score in the past year, Bjt and Ljt the percent of Black and Latino 
students, respectively, LEPjt is the percent of students classified as Limited English 
Proficiency, and Freejt is the school percent eligible for free lunch. TF Ajt is the 
percentage of the school's teachers who are in the TF A program. 
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In order for this model to be valid, I assume that unobserved education inputs are 
not correlated with the decision to request TF A, or to place them in a particular school 
when the analysis is restricted to those schools in the TF A labor market. It does seem 
possible, however, that the schools which decide to work with TFA have either higher 
(more dedication to learning) or lower (more difficulty attracting qualified teachers) 
levels of teaching quality than do their peers. 
In order to test this assumption I regress the percent of TF A teachers in a given 
school against the school characteristics and average score from the previous year. If the 
coefficient on the average score were significant it would suggest that determinants of 
student test scores which were not effectively proxied for by the observed characteristics 
were involved in the assignment of TF A to schools. As a result, I would be unable to 
identify the direction of causality of any link between TF A and test scores. Results 
appear in Table 2. The coefficient on prior year score is not significant (t = .033), but the 
adjusted R-squared for the equation is very low (.014.) Some other unobserved, perhaps 
random, component or components must be responsible for most of the variation in the 
percent of TF A in a school. As it is not correlated with student scores this will at least 
not bias the results. 
The value-added model suggests that introducing TF A teachers provides a small 
but significant increase in student scores over time. The percent receiving free lunch and 
prior year score carry significant coefficients in the expected direction. Percents non-
white and Limited English Proficient are not significant. 
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However, the data suffers from heteroskedasticity - larger schools have less 
volatile average scores than do small schools and individual grades within schools. The 
residuals are also auto-correlated (Durbin-Watson of2.912,) suggesting that scores 
fluctuate more or less randomly around a mean for a given school, so that a year with a 
high score will be followed by one with negative or fairly small change. In order to 
obtain unbiased estimates of the standard errors of the coefficients I use the Newey-West 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation consistent variance estimator. Results appear in 
Table 4. The percent of TF A teachers and of students receiving free lunch are significant 
at the 1 % level, the former positive and the latter negative. Prior year score is also 
significant, and positive, at the 1 % level. The percent of students who are Black, Latino, 
or limited English proficient are insignificant. 
The adjusted R-squared of this regression is very small, suggesting that omitted 
variables and random fluctuation are responsible for the great majority of score change. 
If omitted variables are correlated with the regressors used OLS estimates of the 
coefficients will be biased. In order to test for this correlation I regress the residuals of 
equation (1) on the independent variables. All coefficients are extremely insignificant, 
and the adjusted r-squared is also very small. Results appear in Table 3. 
6.2 Controlling for prior year change 
While controlling for prior year score takes all past inputs into account, it may 
include experiences whose effects ended sometime in the past. These may continue to 
affect a student's level of knowledge and skills without also affecting their accumulation. 
If a student experiences a random shock to their education in one year, i.e. missing a 
period of school, they might achieve less that year, but, as long as the disruption did not 
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recur, would achieve their normal amount in subsequent years. Controlling for prior year 
progress instead shows the change in the schools' ability to produce learning. 
(2) Yijt = (X,l + (X,2 Yijt-l + (X,3Bjt + (X,4Ljt + a5LEPjt + a 6Freejt + ex7 TFAjt + Eijt 
This specification appears to better explain change in scores - the adjusted R-
squared is .13 7 - though unobserved variables still playa very large part. Interestingly, 
the coefficient on previous year change is negative. The effect of the percent of TF A in a 
school appears to be significant, positive, and slightly larger than that in equation (1), 
though still small. The coefficient on the percent of students receiving free lunch is also 
significant and negative. Those on the percents Black, Latino, and Limited English 
Proficient are insignificant. 
The data continues to suffer from heteroskedasticity and serially auto correlated 
residuals. After correcting for this, again by using Newey-West heteroskedasticity and 
serial correlation corisistent variance estimates, the effect of TF A teachers is significant 
and positive, and the effects of the percent of students who are Latino or receive free 
lunch significant and negative. Interestingly, the coefficient on prior year change is 
negative, significant, and far larger in magnitude than are any others. This might suggest 
that change becomes increasingly difficult as more progress is made, or, perhaps more 
likely, that many schools experience one-off increases in scores, leading to negative 
change in the next year. Results appear in Table 4. 
Again, the adjusted R-squared is very small, so omitted variables are a concern. 
Random changes are likely the cause of much of the variation, but many variables which 
may affect education outcomes are not included. Testing reveals that any omitted 
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variables are uncorrelated with the independent variables, so they at least do not bias the 
results. Test results appear in Table 3. 
6.3 Elementary vs. Middle School Grades 
TF A teachers tend to be overrepresented in elementary schools, both in New York 
City and in general, so restricting my analysis to elementary grades may better highlight 
the impact TF A teachers have on schools. More importantly, education occurs very 
differently in early grades than it does later. A single teacher has the opportunity to 
affect more students in a given year at a middle school, but also plays a smaller part in 
determining a given student's progress. To a certain extent the skills and knowledge 
which are taught in early grades are different from those addressed later, the former 
emphasizing behavior and learning techniques, the latter more factual knowledge. 
Teachers in elementary schools are forced to understand and communicate all subjects, 
while those in middle schools are expected to have more depth and less breadth in their 
knowledge and teaching abilities. The students too are different, both developmentally 
and in their experiences, requiring different strategies and character traits to teach well. 
Comparing elementary and middle schools is complicated by the fact that some 
schools change to a standard middle and high school paradigm - separate classes for 
separate subjects, some amount of student choice, and increased leveling or tracking - in 
6th grade, while others do not do so until the 7th grade. In other schools there may be a 
transition over the course of several years. In order to account for this I use equation (1) 
with a break at both the 6th and 7th grades, correcting for heteroskedasticity and serially 
autocorrelated residuals with Newey-West estimates. The results are quantitatively 
19 
different, but qualitatively similar, so I will discuss only the results with the break at the 
7th grade. Regression results for both appear in Table 5. 
The regression for middle schools accounts for almost ten times as much of the 
variation in scores as does that for elementary schools (adjusted R-squared of .198 versus 
.025.) The coefficient for prior year score is negative for both groups, perhaps suggesting 
that change is smaller when students start at a higher level. The effects of all background 
variables are markedly larger for the middle school group, with the exception of the 
percent of students receiving free lunch, which is approximately the same. The percents 
of Latino and LEP students are not significant for elementary schools, but are at the .01 
and .05 levels, respectively, for middle schools. Students classified LEP in middle school 
were likely not in the district, or perhaps even in the country, when they went through 
elementary schools, so their lower scores may be associated with missing the early years 
of the US or N ew York City education system as much as with not speaking English 
fluently. This suggests that a student's background and academic history are far more 
deterministic in later years, and that this carries over to the school level. 
The effect of TF A is positive for both groups, but only significant for elementary 
school students (using the 6th grade as a break point makes the TFA effect in middle 
schools significant, though still much smaller than that in elementary schools.) This is 
somewhat surprising, as subject matter knowledge, which TF A teachers tend to have a lot 
of, is generally understood to be more important in later grades, while teacher training, 
which TFA teachers have relatively little of, is expected to be more important in earlier 
grades. It might be that the energy and idealism which TF A teachers tend to have is more 
important to teaching younger students, or even that younger students are more receptive 
to them. In any case, it suggests that TFA's decision to place its teachers largely in 
elementary schools is an efficient one. 
6.4 Functions Allowing for Interaction 
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The level of one education input likely affects the effectiveness of others. For 
example, teacher skill might have a larger effect when the students are further behind or 
are learning in a language in which they are not fluent. Studies which have allowed for 
some sort of interaction between inputs have found inputs to be statistically significant 
more often than those which have not, suggesting that imposing a simple linear structure 
on the educational production function excludes considerable information (Figlio, 99). In 
order to allow for interaction I estimate a logarithmic function: 
(3) Ln(Yijt)= UI + u2In(Sijt-l) + u3In(Bjt) +u4In(Ljt) + usln(LEPjt) + u6In(FREEjr) + 
u71n(TF AjD + Eijt 
After correcting for heteroskedasticity and serially autocorrelated residuals the effect of 
TF A is positive and significant. Aside from this, only free lunch appears to be 
significant, in the expected direction, and of larger magnitude. Results appear in Table 4. 
While the logarithmic function allows the level of one input to affect the 
effectiveness of another, it does little to illuminate how this occurs. For this task a model 
with interaction terms is necessary. I interact the percentage of TF A teachers in a school 
with all background variables and the prior year score. 
(4) Yijt = UI + U2Sijt-1 + U3Bjt + U4Ljt + usLEPjt + U6Freejt+ u7TFAjt 
+ U8Sijt-l *TFAjt + U9Bjt*TFAjt + ulOLjt*TFAjt + ullLEPjt*TFAjt + u12Freejt*TFAjt 
+ Eijt 
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Results appear in Table 6. TF A appears to be less effective in schools with higher 
percentages of students with free lunch, higher percentages of Latino students, and lower 
prior year scores. The coefficients on all these variables when not interacted with the 
percent of teachers who are TF A are all insignificant with the exception of prior year 
score. This suggests that schools with TF A teachers have a harder time than others at 
helping high-minority, low-income, and limited-English students succeed than they 
would a' student population with lower need, and that this gap is larger than that faced 
with non-TF A schools, and implicitly non-TF A teachers. It may be that the skills TF A 
teachers tend to lack, specifically pedagogical training, are more important in teaching 
high-need students, or that the schools in which TF A teachers teach are less able to 
address the needs of these students. The difference in the backgrounds of students and 
teachers may also matter - TF A teachers have a higher probability of being white and 
relatively affluent than do either the students they teach or the other teachers in that 
school. 
In a hypothetical extremely high-need school with 1 % TF A, 100% free lunch 
eligibility, 30% of students classified as Limited English Proficient, and a scale score of 
600, the net effect of TF A would still be positive, though insignificant. TF A's decision 
to focus on high-need schools does not appear to harm them. It does mean that TF A 
teachers may be powerless to change education for the highest-need students by their 
work in the classroom. 
Placing TF A teachers in the more difficult schools may, however, be an efficient, 
or at least effective, way of producing motivated backers and national attention. To the 
extent that these focus resources and energy on the education gap TF A's placement 
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policy may be a good choice for producing overall change, which, rather than immediate 
student achievement, is the organization's end goal. 
7. Conclusion 
Teach for America depends on the teachers it recruits and trains to act as the foot 
soldiers for educational change. While several studies have evaluated their impact on the 
students they teach, none before has sought t6 find the school-level effect of TF A 
teachers, which should be the most pertinent to decisions by school administrators on 
whether or not to hire TF A teachers. It appears that TF A teachers do have a distinct 
positive effect on the schools they teach in. Unfortunately, this level of data does not 
allow me to decompose the TF A effect into turnover and quality effects, or to probe the 
potential of TF A teachers to affect the labor market. That this effect differs markedly 
between elementary and middle school-level classes is somewhat surprising, but it also 
suggests that TF A has been placing its teachers in the correct level of classes, though 
perhaps unknowingly. 
Perhaps most interesting is the finding that TF A teachers would be most effective 
with students they are unlikely to encounter, and which the program does not focus on. It 
may be that special teaching skills are more necessary for students with fewer advantages 
and less history of performance, or that TF A teachers struggle to connect to students who 
tend to come from a different background than theirs. The solution to this problem 
depends on which of these is its source, which could be probed with richer data on 
teacher characteristics. In any case, it would be a useful one for TF A, and other 
alternative certification programs, to know and implement. 
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All standard error and significance estimates in this and following tables made using the 
Newey-West heteroskeasticity and serial autocorrelation consistent variance estimator. 
* Significant at .1 level 
** Significant at .05 level 
*** Significant at .01 level 
Table 3. Tests of Correlated Residuals and Independent Variables (Section 6.1 and 6.2) 
Dependent Variable Residuals 
Specification Prior Year Score Prior Year Change 
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Constant -3.74E-15 0.596 1.48E-14 0.789 
PercentTFA -6.84E-18 0.0334 8.13E-17 0.047 
Percent Free Lunch -2.21E-16 0.00876 2.26E-16 0.0101 
Percent Latino 2.00E-16 0.0104 -5.73E-16 0.0126 
Percent Black 1.71E-16 0.0112 -2.09E-16 0.0136 
Percent LEP 1.03E-16 0.0283 3.64E-16 0.017 
Prior Year Score 4.21 E-18 0.00032 
Prior Year Change -9.06E-17 0.0243 
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Table 4. Value Added Models and Logarithmic Model (Sections 6.1, 6.2, 6.4) 
Dependant 
Variable Change in Score 
Log Change in Score 
Specification Prior Year Score Prior Year Change 
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
*** -
Constant ***2.297 0.596 ***6.722 0.808 Constant 57.292 9.558 
Percent TFA ***0.111 0.0333 ***0.134 0.0431 Log(Percent TFA) **0.115 0.0495 
** *** - -
Percent Free Lunch ***-0.031 0.00876 0.0209 0.00949 Log(Percent Free Lunch) 0.346 0.0957 
Percent Latino 0.0107 0.0103 0.012 0.0123 Log(Percent Latino) -0.237 0.207 
Percent Black -0.0168 0.0112 *-0.0249 0.0133 Log(Percent Black) 0.0458 0.0756 
Percent LEP -0.00885 0.0283 -0.0302 0.0253 Log(Percent LEP) 0.141 0.11 
Prior Year Score ***0.00715 0.00032 Log(Prior Year Score) ***9.420 1.464 
Prior Year Change ***-0.440 0.0359 
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Table 5. Elementary and Middle School Grades 
Dependant Variable Change in Score 
Specification Grades 3-5 Grades 6-8 Grades 3-6 Grades 7-8 
Std. Std. Std. Std. 
Coefficient Error Coefficient Error Coefficient Error Coefficient Error 
Constant ***72.242 10.16 ***195.585 20.879 ***45.839 10.039 ***218.195 32.577 
Percent TFA **0.173 0.0813 **0.0846 0.039634 ***0.216 0.052 0.0761 0.0572 
Percent Free Lunch ***-0.0564 0.0134 ***0.0618 0.0174 ***-0.0569 0.0122 **-0.0489 0.0223 
Percent Latino *-0.0286 0.01 64 ***-0.123 0.0295 -0.00566 0.0145 ***-0.130 0.337 
Percent Black ***-0.0815 0.0193 ***-0.199 0.0311 **-.0549 0.0178 ***-0.209 0.0378 
Percent LEP -0.0307 0.0373 *-0.0734 0.0381 -0.0347 0.0348 **-0.124 0.0484 
Prior Year Score ***-0.0933 0.0147 ***-0.258 0.0285 ***-0.0535 0.0144 ***-0.291 0.0443 
Table 6. Interaction Term Model (Section 6.4) 
Dependent Variable Change in Score 
Specification Interaction Terms 
Coefficient Std. Error 
Constant ***2.232 0.598 
Percent TFA 0.7555 0.666 
Percent Free Lunch ***-0.0304 0.00966 
Percent Free Lunch * Percent TFA *-0.00538 0.00321 
Percent Latino 0.00361 0.00981 
Percent Latino * Percent TFA -8.54E-05 0.00809 
Percent Black -0.01429 0.0118 
Percent Black * Percent TFA -0.00273 0.00731 
Percent LEP 0.0235 0.0241 
Percent LEP * Percent TFA **-0.00949 0.00434 
Prior Year Score ***.00685 0.000368 
Prior Year Score * Percent TFA **0.000157 7.54E-05 
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